try of my relation to (the finite) other in which I recognize my infinite responsibility for the other." But when the idea of the infinite is "put into me," Cavell asks, why should it be infinite responsibility for this other that is revealed, rather than, as Cavell believes, "infinite responsibility for myself," together with "finite responsibility for the claims of the existence of the other upon me, claims perhaps of gratitude or sympathy or protection or duty or debt or love? In an extreme situation. I may put the other's life (not just her or his wishes or needs) ahead of mine, answerable to or for them without limit." Although my responsibility to the finite Other is finite, I 15 " . Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 13 ch. 6. " . Ibid., 145. 14 " . Ibid., 145. 15 have an infinite responsibility to myself, in Cavell's view-an absolute obligation to express myself, to make myself intelligible to myself as well as to others, apart from which I cannot know myself, cannot make myself known to others, cannot achieve the acknowledgment of others (my acknowledgment of them, their acknowledgment of me), cannot walk in the direction of an unattained but attainable self, as Emerson liked to put it.
Cavell writes, "What the marriage in The Philadelphia Story comes to, I mean what it fantasizes"-or what Cavell is fantasizing that the film is fantasizing-is "a proposed marriage or balance between Western culture's two forces of authority, so that American mankind can refind its object, its dedication to a more perfect union, toward the perfected human community, its right to the pursuit of happiness." And These last words help to set up the chapter's splendid conclusion, which calls attention to "the events of the ending of the film," events that have, as Cavell puts it, "a peculiar bearing on the issue of viewing." Reluctantly, I'll resist the temptation to 18 spend all the time I have left reading Cavell's reading of the ending of The Philadelphia Story, and cut directly to the chapter's last sentences:
The ambiguous status of these figures and hence of our perceptual state will have the effect of compromising or undermining our efforts to arrive at a conclusion about the narrative. For example, shall we say that the film ends with Then what "self" performs the act? What "self" does the work reveal?
All the time I was writing this first section, I had the gnawing feeling that there must have been a philosopher who had expressed such thoughts. How was I to know that this philosopher was Emerson? And far from exemplifying my theory of artistic expression, predicated on the idea that artistic self-expression changes the artist, my view of the art of film was incompatible with it, predicated as it was on the idea that authoring a film leaves the author unchanged. I concluded the dissertation with a close shot-by-shot reading of Hitchcock's Notorious, but that reading failed to acknowledge, or address, the conflict between the what I can now recognize as the Emersonianism in the first section and the skepticism in the second. Nor did the revised rea-ding I published in The Georgia Review, with the addition of numerous frames from the film, which I was to use as the model for the readings in The Murderous Gaze. As a consequence, a skeptical thread runs through The Murderous Gaze that co-exists uneasily with expressions of the affinity I had come to feel with the affirmative dimension of Cavell's philosophical outlook, to which Pursuits of Happiness gives fuller expression than any of his previous writings.
Just when I had finished the 39 Steps chapter and was again satisfied that I had completed the book, news reached me that Hitchcock had died. That day, I began writing a "Postscript" that meditated on the welter of emotions his death aroused in me. The depth of my own feelings told me-I didn't need Cavell's prodding this time -that my book, intended to pay the tuition for the intuition that for Hitchcock film was first and foremost a medium of self-expression-would be incomplete unless I found a way to express how personal the writing of this book was for me, the strength of my attachment, not just intellectually but emotionally, to Hitchcock's films. It is a theme that runs through The Murderous Gaze that in a Hitchcock film, just because something is a fantasy doesn't mean it isn't also reality. The Postscript I composed, in a Hitchcockian spirit, accounts for the book's writing by spinning what is unabashedly a fantasy-Cavell might prefer to call it a daydream-without making any claim as to that fantasy's relationship to my waking reality. This is how the Postscript ends:
Film, in Hitchcock's work, is the medium by which he made himself known, or at least knowable-the bridge between himself and us. But it is also a barrier that stands between Hitchcock and us. It stands for everything that separates Hitchcock from his audience, and indeed for everything that separates any one human being from all others. By dedicating his life to the making of films that are calls for acknowledgment, while doing everything in his power to assure that such acknowledgment would be deferred until after his death, Hitchcock remained true to his art, and true to the medium of film. embrace the American genre's Emersonian outlook because he wasn't yet willing to abandon the idea, which had always attracted him and on which his artistic "brand" was based, that we are all fated to kill the thing we love. In Must We Kill the Thing We Love?, the book I published two years after I wrote the Marnie reading, my central claim is that Hitchcock's ambivalence toward Emersonian perfectionism, and his ambivalence toward overcoming that ambivalence, was the driving force of his art.
The book discerns a progression from his British thrillers to his earliest American films (made when the Emersonian outlook was starting to suffer repression in Hollywood); to his wartime films; his postwar films; his masterpieces of the 1950s; and ultimately to Marnie (1964) , in which Hitchcock overcame his ambivalence and embraced the Emersonian perfectionism he had always resisted.
When I was writing the original five readings, I was in almost daily conversation with Cavell. But as drawn as I was to his philosophical and moral outlook, I
had always also been as drawn as Hitchcock was to the idea that we're all in our private traps and are fated to kill the thing we love. After all, the Postscript I wrote In telling the story of his life, Cavell's aspiration was, as he put it, to compose "a philosopher's or writer's autobiography, which tells the writer's story of the life out of which he came to be a (his kind of) writer." To tell this story, he writes, "I would 25 have to show that telling the accidental, anonymous, in a sense posthumous, days of my life is the making of philosophy." Because our memories of movies are "strand 26 over strand" with memories of our lives, to tell the story of the life out of which he became his kind of philosopher, he found it necessary to evoke every moment with such concrete particularity, that the resulting memoir reads like an elegantly written scre- For Wittgenstein, philosophy's goal is to bring philosophy to an end. For Cavell, too, philosophy is inescapably concerned with endings. In an essay called "Precious Memories in Philosophy and Film," I wrote: "in The World Viewed, he brought to an end the period of his life in which going to the movies was a regular part of his week. In Little Did I Know, he told the story of the period of his life that ended when he was reborn as the only kind of writer, the only kind of philosopher, who could have written such a book (or could have wanted to)." In writing this philosophical memoir, too, Cavell brought to an end a period of his life-the period that began where the story the book tells ends-the period in which he fully yielded to his longing for philosophy. Writing the book that tells this story is inseparable from the story it tells. In this writing, Cavell was as committed as ever to walking in the direction of the unattained but attainable self but, as I put it, "his way of moving forward was by looking back." In telling this story, he brought its meaning home. This "philosophical memoir" is "not only 'under its own question'"; it finds the answer it had been seeking with an all but unappeasable yearning. For Cavell, philosophy had achieved its end.
I'm still journeying on.
